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ABSTRACT
Jake Greenblum and Ryan K Hubbard argue 
that physicians, nurses, clinical ethicists and 
ethics committee members should not cite 
religious considerations when helping patients 
(or their proxies) make medical decisions.i They 
provide two arguments for this position: The 
Public Reason Argument and the Fiduciary 
Argument. In this essay, I show that the 
Public Reason Argument fails. Greenblum 
and Hubbard may provide good reason to 
think that physicians should not invoke their 
own religious commitments as reasons for a 
particular medical decision. But they fail to 
show that it is wrong for physicians to cite 
the patient’s own religious commitments as 
reasons for a particular decision. As such, if 
Greenblum and Hubbard’s thesis is to survive, 
the Fiduciary Argument (or some unmentioned 
argument) will have to do the bulk of the work.
INTRODUCTION
Jake Greenblum and Ryan K Hubbard 
argue that physicians, nurses, clinical 
ethicists and ethics committee members 
should not cite religious considerations 
when helping patients (or proxies) make 
medical decisions.1i Even if a patient 
claims that a religious tenet is relevant to 
her decision-making process, physicians 
should not ‘engage’. That is, physicians 
should not cite the tenet as relevant to the 
decision-making process, debate with the 
patient over the meaning (or application) 
of the tenet, nor cite alternative religious 
tenets that may affect the patient’s deci-
sions. Patients who insist on discussing 
religious considerations should be referred 
to an appropriate expert (eg, a chaplain).ii 
Greenblum and Hubbard give two 
‘logically distinct’ arguments for their 
position: The Public Reason Argument 
and the Fiduciary Argument. In this essay, 
I argue that the Public Reason Argument 
fails.iii First, I identify the target of the 
argument—the ‘dominant view’—before 
discussing (and responding to) the Public 
Reason Argument itself. I conclude that 
if physicians have ‘no business’ discussing 
religious considerations when helping 
patients make decisions, it is not because 
of the Public Reason Argument.
The ‘dominant view’
Greenblum and Hubbard reject the ‘domi-
nant view’ that, ‘physicians should engage 
with patients on the patient’s or physi-
cian’s own substantive religious grounds 
if the patient cites religious considerations 
during the process of deliberation’.1 The 
dominant view, therefore, is a disjunction 
of two statements:
A. Physicians should engage with patients 
on the patient’s own substantive reli-
gious grounds if the patient cites reli-
gious considerations during the pro-
cess of deliberation.
B. Physicians should engage with patients 
on the physician’s own substantive re-
ligious grounds if the patient cites re-
ligious considerations during the pro-
cess of deliberation.
To succeed as a standalone argument, the 
Public Reason Argument must show that 
both A and B are false. After all, refuting 
a disjunction requires showing that both 
of its disjuncts are false. So, if the argu-
ment undermines A but not B (or vice 
versa) it fails to undermine the dominant 
view.
The Public Reason Argument
The Public Reason Argument proceeds as 
follows:
1. Public employees (eg, lawmakers) 
should ‘cite only public reasons in 
their capacity as professionals’.
2. Physicians are ‘relevantly akin to pub-
lic employees’.
3. Hence, physicians should cite only 
public reasons in their capacity as 
professionals.
Public reasons are ‘non-sectarian reasons’ 
or ‘considerations that any reasonable 
person could recognise as counting in 
favour of something’, regardless of differ-
ences in ‘ethical outlooks’.1 A public 
reason for reducing carbon emissions, for 
example, is that ‘clean air is necessary for 
the public’s health’.1 Lastly, public reasons 
are said to be ‘grounded in brute norma-
tive intuitions or shared social values’.1 
Whether or not there are public reasons 
is controversial (not to mention claims 
that these reasons are grounded in ‘brute 
intuitions or shared social values’ and are 
accessible to any ‘reasonable’ person).iv I 
will ignore those concerns, however. The 
Public Reason Argument still fails because 
Premise 2 is false.
Akin, but not relevantly
There may be ways in which physicians 
are akin to public employees, but not in 
relevant ways. Lawmakers—the para-
digmatic example of public employees 
for Greenblum and Hubbard—advance 
policies that apply to morally pluralistic 
groups of people. When making decisions 
for a diverse population, it makes sense to 
restrict deliberations to public reason (ie, 
reasons that can be acknowledged by all 
to whom the relevant decisions apply). A 
patient is not a morally pluralistic group 
of people. A patient is a singular person. 
When helping a patient make a decision, 
physicians are not instituting policies for a 
plurality of persons. So, they need not rely 
on reasons that would appeal to a diverse 
population. When citing reasons for a 
decision, physicians need only cite reasons 
that the patient finds acceptable (or, at 
least, understandable). These reasons may 
even include religious considerations (at 
least when a patient herself cites them 
as relevant). Whether or not the cited 
reasons are acceptable (or understandable) 
to other patients is irrelevant. The deci-
sion being made is not binding for other 
patients. Thus, physicians and lawmakers 
are not relevantly alike.
Jarring Assertions and Social Norms
Greenblum and Hubbard provide two 
other cases in defence of the Public Reason 
Argument. First, a patient described as ‘a 
devout Hindu’, complains of chest pain. 
After inferring that the patient may have 
lung cancer, the physician, Dr. Chatterjee, 
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i Following Greenblum and Hubbard, I 
will use ‘physician’ to refer to all of these 
professionals.
ii Thus, religious considerations are not 
banned from the decision-making process. 
Greenblum and Hubbard simply advocate 
a ‘division of labour’ between experts.1
iii For the sake of space, I cannot respond 
to the Fiduciary Argument here.
iv See works by Engelhardt, MacIntyre, 
Enoch and Mang for a small sample of objec-
tions.2–7 Quong provides an overview of the 
debate regarding public reason as well.8
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v See Grice’s work for a well-known 
account of conversational norms.9
tells the patient ‘that there is a new and 
medically promising lung cancer treat-
ment available…and then adds that since 
Lord Shiva urges us to purify our bodies’ 
the patient ‘should take advantage of the 
treatment’.1 Dr. Chatterjee’s assertion is 
jarring, Greenblum and Hubbard argue, 
because ‘it is not her place to offer religious 
considerations in the doctor’s office’.1
Yet, Greenblum and Hubbard fail 
to frame the case properly. The domi-
nant view states that ‘physicians should 
engage with patients on … substantive 
religious grounds if the patient cites reli-
gious considerations during the process 
of deliberation’.1 It does not mention 
cases in which patients do not cite reli-
gious considerations. Dr. Chatterjee’s 
patient makes no mention of his faith. 
Thus, it is jarring when Dr. Chatterjee 
suddenly starts talking about religious 
tenets. Dr. Chatterjee’s assertion would 
be far less jarring had it been made after 
the patient himself mentioned the rele-
vance of his faith to his decision-making 
process.
Imagine a revised case: After the patient 
describes his faith as providing him with 
a reason to promote bodily health, Dr. 
Chatterjee responds by describing avail-
able treatment for lung cancer and adds, 
“Since you see your faith as pushing 
you towards treatment, you have all the 
more reason to do it.” If Greenblum and 
Hubbard are correct, then this assertion 
should be just as jarring as the original 
case. On their view, whether the patient 
has mentioned religious considerations 
or not, it is not the physician’s ‘place’ to 
cite religious considerations. But I expect 
the revised case is not as jarring to the 
reader.
If that is right, then we need an expla-
nation for why the original case is jarring, 
but the revised case is not. Possibilities 
abound. Perhaps Dr. Chatterjee violates 
some conversational norms in the original 
case (but not the revised case) by intro-
ducing unprompted or extraneous infor-
mation into the conversation.v Or maybe 
she violates some social norms (matters 
of etiquette, not morality) in the original 
case, by assuming the patient’s religion is 
relevant to his decision-making process 
without his having said it is. Plausibly, 
this is a kind of assumption that nobody 
(physician or otherwise) should make 
when speaking with a stranger.
Whatever the case, Greenblum and 
Hubbard’s explanation faces two prob-
lems. First, there are many competing 
explanations for why readers will find 
Dr. Chatterjee’s assertion to be jarring. 
On alternative explanations, some viola-
tion of conversational (or social) norms 
occurs and that violation is sufficient to 
explain why the assertion is jarring. Thus, 
we need not grant that the assertion is 
jarring because the physician is ‘overstep-
ping’ her place.1 Second, an implication of 
Greenblum and Hubbard’s view is that the 
revised case will be just as jarring as the 
original case. That seems false. If so, then 
alternative explanations—which explain 
why Dr. Chatterjee’s assertion is jarring 
in the original case but not in the revised 
case—fit the data better than Greenblum 
and Hubbard’s explanation.
The instructor analogy: an incomplete 
response
The second case that Greenblum and 
Hubbard use to defend the Public Reason 
Argument compares physicians to instruc-
tors at public universities. Specifically, a 
student seeks academic advice from an 
instructor. Since ‘the site of the exchange 
is public…it would be inappropriate for 
the instructor to give the student academic 
advice based on the instructor’s religion’.1 
Analogously, if patients seek medical 
advice, it would be wrong for physicians 
to make recommendations based on the 
physician’s own religion. This challenges 
Statement B, but not Statement A. To 
challenge A, the case must be rewritten. 
The revised case should specify that the 
student cites her own religious perspective 
as relevant to her decision. Greenblum 
and Hubbard would then have to show 
that the instructor would be wrong to cite 
that perspective as relevant. Since they fail 
to do so, however, the instructor analogy 
undermines Statement B (at most), leaving 
Statement A—and, therefore, the domi-
nant view—intact.
CONCLUSION
The Public Reason Argument fails as a 
response to the dominant view. As such, 
the Fiduciary Argument (or some unmen-
tioned argument) must bear the weight 
of supporting Greenblum and Hubbard’s 
thesis. Whether or not the Fiduciary Argu-
ment is up to the task is a question I leave 
for another time.
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